Syria and the Responsibility to Protect by Thakur, Ramesh
39Syria and the Responsibility to Protect
The civilian protection agenda has tried to fill critical gaps in the existing normative architecture 
through the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (POC) as sibling norms.1 
Despite these two valuable additions to the repertoire of the international community in dealing with 
civilian victims of armed conflicts, many gaps remain in the protection agenda, as shown in several 
cases—from Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar to Darfur and, most prominently this year, Syria.2
The failure to protect Syrian civilians stems from five sets of factors: conceptual conundrums in 
relation to an armed civil war; the difficulty of establishing culpability for atrocities with sufficient 
clarity; parallel difficulties of satisfying the balance of consequences test; NATO excesses in Libya 
linked to the West’s reluctance to share a rule-writing role with the new emerging powers; and the 
latter’s reticence in accepting the burdens of being joint managers of the world order, which requires 
a mix of power, norms, and ideas for good global governance.3
1. Fighting erupted in Syria in early 2011 as the Arab Spring rapidly spread eastwards from Tunisia 
and Egypt. President Bashar al Assad launched a fierce crackdown on the initially peaceful pro-
democracy protests, and the country swiftly descended into full-fledged civil war that sucked in 
various foreign jihadists and rival outside backers, raising two problematical questions. Is the 
recognised state prohibited from employing force to fend off armed challenges to its authority? With 
the ensuing spread and escalation of humanitarian crises, how can the moral hazard of encouraging 
other opposition and secessionist groups to take up arms against governments elsewhere be 
avoided? In addition, what is the appropriate boundary demarcation between POC/R2P, on the one 
hand, and international humanitarian and human rights laws, on the other, in regulating the conduct 
of conflict parties in civil wars?
2. In the midst of a highly emotive war, critical question marks need to be substituted for excitable 
exclamation marks regarding the facts and possible responses. Too often slogans pass for policy: 
something must be done; this is something; therefore this must be done.
Casualty figures are deliberately manipulated and misused through casual elision. Leading US 
politicians routinely condemned the Assad regime for having massacred more than 100,000 people. 
That figure represents the total number of people killed. The best available estimate, provided by the 
Syrian Observatory on Human Rights, breaks it down as follows: civilians, 40,146; rebels, 21,850; 
government soldiers, 27,645; pro-regime militias, 17,824; others/unknown, 2,897; total, 110,371 (as 
of mid-September 2013).4
With regard to chemical weapons use—a qualitative escalation that crosses the atrocity threshold 
in that all weapons of mass destruction are inherently indiscriminate and inhumane in their deadly 
effects—the UN investigation team led by Ake Sellstrom recently confirmed, without attributing 
responsibility to any party, that chemical weapons had been used in five instances during the Syrian 
civil war.5 The West did not help its credibility problem by jumping to conclusions that they were used 
by the regime. Seymour Hersh argues that, like Bush in Iraq in 2003, Obama had cherry-picked 
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facts and intelligence, presenting assumptions as facts, implying a sequence that reversed reality, 
and omitting important intelligence pointing to the jihadist al-Nusra’s capability to make and mount a 
chemical weapon attack with sarin.6
3. What could the world do in response without further inflaming an extremely volatile region and 
badly damaging key major power relations? The fluid and confused internal situation; question marks 
over the identity, intent, and methods of the rebels; the risk of atrocities against minority groups if 
the regime collapsed; relations with Iran, China, and Russia; and the deepening Sunni-Shia divide 
all around the Islamic crescent in the Middle East made it impossible to assess the balance of 
consequences of outside intervention with confidence. A war-weary US public doubts the West has 
any dog in the fight in the Syrian civil war where a rebel commander filmed himself eating the heart 
of a government soldier and almost half the rebel fighters are jihadists.7 There is the added risk of 
blowback as radicalised Western Muslims take up arms to go and fight in Syria, and return with an 
extremist ideology and battle experience.
Retired US Air Force General Michael Hayden, head of the CIA until 2009, argues there are 
three possible outcomes to the conflict: continuing fighting between ever more extreme rebel and 
pro-government sectarian factions, disintegration of Syria as a state with flow-on destabilising 
consequences for the whole region, or the survival of the Assad regime. Given the alternatives, 
Hayden concluded, reluctantly, that the last was the best.8
4. The 2011 Libya crisis showcased the mobilising power of R2P as a new norm that led China and 
Russia to abstain, rather than veto, Resolution 1973. The initial response to the crisis was a textbook 
example of R2P Pillar Three military intervention. But the NATO operation soon exposed a critical gap 
between the proclamation of a no-fly zone, prohibition of regime change, and effective provision of 
civilian protection. The last required regime change that would break the Security Council consensus. 
There also developed a significant gap in communications, expectations, and accountability between 
those who authorised and those who implemented Resolution 1973. The post-Gaddafi turmoil and 
volatility in Libya further complicated international responses to the ongoing crisis in Syria by raising 
doubts about the long-term results of R2P-type military action.
5. The refusal to entertain overtures for a negotiated outcome that might have left Muammar Gaddafi 
in power fatally undercut efforts to build global support for military strikes on Syria. No foreign 
country has been attacked by Syria. Other than self-defence against armed external attack, only UN 
authorisation provides legal cover for military strikes. Without UN authorisation, military strikes would 
be neither lawful nor legitimate, just another instance of vigilante justice by a trigger-happy and 
seemingly out-of-control West. The international community cannot be collapsed into a mini-NATO 
coalition of the willing. The rest saw a determination by the NATO P3 to enforce humanitarian norms 
inside other countries’ sovereign jurisdictions by flouting higher-order global norms on restrictions 
on the threat and use of force internationally. The latter are more critical to most countries’ national 
security and international stability.
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China and Russia were adamantly opposed to authorisation of any international action without host-
state consent and to any resolution that could set in motion a sequence of events leading to 1973-type 
outside military operations in Syria.9 After the allegations of chemical warfare on 21 August, President 
Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry clamoured for Syria to submit to US authority and 
surrender to American might. What Russia did, instead, was subject Syria to international law and 
UN authority to get rid of its chemical weapons, at the price of no regime change. President Vladimir 
Putin’s op-ed in the New York Times laid out a narrative of the US as an international rogue state, 
addicted to bullying weaklings in the global backyard, who refuses to kowtow to its dictates.10 The 
morally dubious provenance of the author could not take away the sharp sting of his analysis.
In conclusion, Syria has thrown up challenges, but not thrown out R2P. There is interest in clarifying 
the norm further and tightening operational safeguards to prevent misuse—for example, through 
the Brazilian concept of “Responsibility while Protecting” or a Chinese version of “Responsible 
Protection”—but no demand to rescind the norm, per se. Protecting civilians is a “wicked problem” 
with no solutions, only better or worse outcomes. Our common humanity demands an acceptance of 
a duty of care by all of us who live in zones of safety towards all of those trapped in zones of danger. 
To be meaningful, the R2P spectrum of action must include military force as the option of last resort 
(conceptually, not sequentially). Because of the difficulty in satisfying the balance of consequences 
test in Syria, the failure to unite behind non-coercive military intervention measures to rein in the 
brutal excesses of the Assad regime is the truer indictment of the UN’s ineffectualness.
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